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effect any major improvement of its present position because of the lack of manpower to retain control of any further considerable areas which may be cleared. Government experiments in rearming surrendered personnel are proving risky in that a group of surrendered PVOs who were rearmed for village defense purposes in Pegu district have again gone underground, and nearly 100 members of a newly raised battalion have recently deserted.

4. The new Soviet Ambassador and his staff arrived in Rangoon on 16 April.

BCP Strategy

5. At the BCP Central Committee meeting in September 1950 a four-point plan was laid down for future operations comprising:
 - a. Liberation of Central Burma
 - b. Expansion to the north
 - c. Concentration on the "East Line" (i.e. the Rangoon-Mandalay Road axis)
 - d. The establishment of a base in the Shan States.
6. Subsequent events show that some progress has been made towards its implementation. Reports have indicated the withdrawal of BCP forces from western Central Burma towards the hills to the west of Pyinmana and Yamethin and in May Paukkaung, 25 miles east of Prome, which had been in insurgent hands for over two years, was reoccupied by the Government without opposition. Party organization has been stepped up in the Shan States with the appointment of district officials for a new district headquarters in the Southern Shan States and of Peoples Administration officials for the States of Pwehla, Maw, Yengan, and Pangtara. In April the existence was reported of a BCP headquarters for Hsipaw; a concentration of about 200 BCP insurgents has been in the Nawngkhio area for several months. These developments follow on earlier reports of groups of BCP insurgents moving into the Western Shan States. Attempts are also being made to raise a 4 Division of the Peoples Army in the Shan States, but have so far apparently had little success.
7. In Yamethin district, where concentrations of BCP troops have been reported, attacks against small towns, in particular Pyawbwe and Lowe, were intensified during May and in some cases the attacking force was estimated at about 1,000. These attacks have hitherto been successfully resisted by Government forces. That an offensive was imminent had been indicated in a report of a meeting of BCP leaders which took place on 27 March, in the course of which Thakin THAN TUN announced that sufficient arms were available to arm the BCP forces in about 15 districts. At the same time he ordered a reversal of the previous policy of dispersion and concentration of forces under district arrangements as a preliminary to rearming. When the distribution of arms had been completed an offensive was to begin in Pyinmana, in Yamethin District, and in Toungoo District.
8. At a later meeting held on May Day at which leaders of the Army Mutineers, PVOs and Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) were also present, THAN TUN claimed that the number of arms collected up to that date exceeded the number of their fighting personnel and instructed district representatives to submit their requirements to the Central Committee. Unless therefore the BCP have become discouraged at their initial lack of success a continued and possibly more widespread offensive must be expected.
9. The sources from which this apparent increased supply of arms was obtained is still in doubt. The possibility that a proportion of them were supplied from China is dealt with in paragraph 23 below.

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BCP-PDF Policy

10. At an Upper Burma PDF conference on 17 March 1951 Thakin THAN TUN made an important speech in which he reviewed the whole of BCP policy. He remarked that the Upper Burma Conference was to consider the preparatory steps for the convention of an All Burma Congress which would announce the formation of a Peoples Democratic Republic of Burma. He claimed that the national liberation struggle in Burma was directly connected with the World Peace movement because the American expansionists were turning Burma into a military base for an attack on New China. Burma was in the front line of American expansionism and Upper Burma was a key area where events would be a deciding factor in the revolution in Southern Asia. It was therefore essential for the BCP to establish an impregnable stronghold in Upper Burma.
11. Thakin NU's neutrality policy, THAN TUN demonstrated, was hypo-critical and NU was in fact whole-heartedly on the side of the Americans and disseminating anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet propaganda. It was not true that THAN TUN had signed an agreement with MAO Tse-tung; the two had not yet met nor had any agreement been signed. It was also untrue to suggest that China had any designs on Burmese territory. On the contrary, the Americans were planning to attack China and Thakin NU was assisting them. Thus it was the particular task of the BCP in opposing American expansionism and working for world peace to overthrow the Thakin NU Government and establish a Peoples Democratic Government in Burma. These aims formed common ground between the forces of peace in the "liberated areas" and elements with similar ideals which were emerging in Government-held areas, with whom they were ready to unite.
12. The key points in the Party's program, he continued, were:
 - a. The establishment of a Peoples Democratic Government in which all groups and nationalities would have democratic representation.
 - b. The unity of all revolutionary forces.
 - c. The organization of the "liberated areas" into a single unit with a centralized Peoples Administration which would prepare the way for the creation of a Central Government; the creation of a Central Peoples Administration Board must be attempted before the end of 1951.
 - d. The protection of the rights of minorities and the abolition of feudalism in the minority areas, though this latter aim must take second place to the campaign against American expansionism.
 - e. Improvement of social conditions including education, public health and suppression of crime, the creation of a self-supporting economic system, and the issue of a "Peoples Currency".
 - f. The implementation of an agrarian revolution with the agreement of the masses; this would secure the support of the peasants and thus create a source of reserves for the military forces.
 - g. Intensive mobile offensive warfare aiming at the permanent occupation of small towns, thus strengthening control over local communications as a preliminary to the occupation of major towns.
13. Three principal factors for the success of the Peoples Democratic Revolution were the consolidation of the Peoples Democratic Front, the enlargement of the unified Peoples Army to include other revolutionary armed forces, and the strengthening of the leadership of the working classes, that is the Communist Party. The creation of a single Communist Party was of

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fundamental importance and unity with the Communist Party (Burma) (CP(B)) was the key to the unification of Marxist forces; the Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party (BWPP) which claimed to be Marxist, and the Peoples Volunteer Organization which represented itself as the Party of the proletariat, should also join in the single Communist Party.

14. In reviewing the progress made in the BCP's relations with other revolutionary groups, as a result of the revised policy adopted by the BCP Central Committee in September 1950, THAN TUN explained that:
 - a. A truce had been declared with KNDO troops in Toungoo, Pegu, Thaton, and the Delta areas and it had been agreed to cooperate in military operations; the BCP was now attempting to come to terms with the leaders of the KNDO Central headquarters. This agreement with KNDO troops was important since it converted the former racial warfare into class warfare.
 - b. With the CP(B) the BCP had agreed to stop fighting each other, to collaborate against the Government, to work for the expansion of the United Front and the establishment of a single Communist Party. The time had come to give substance to this agreement but difficulties were expected owing to the vacillating policy and unorthodox organization of the CP(B), which was more anarchist than Communist.
 - c. Truces on a regional basis had been reached with the PVOs but agreement had still not been reached for joint military operations and they must strive to secure the return of all PVOs to the United Front.
 - d. The emergence of the BWPP was a favorable omen and the BCP would support all their anti-expansionist and anti-AFPFL activities; the intensification of the peace campaign, the struggle for democratic rights and the improvement of mass organization in the "unliberated areas" was of great importance.
 - e. There were other elements emerging who were opposed to the AFPFL, among Members of Parliament, writers and journalists, and these must be organized into a single body.
15. The BCP, he said, was at all times ready to discuss measures of unification and would attempt to hold a conference before the end of 1951 with the KNDO forces, the CP(B), and the PVOs towards the formation of a single Army. The constitution of the United Front, on which opinions varied, would also have to be carefully discussed.
16. Since this speech was made in March there have been further developments in the BCP's relations with other insurgent groups, the most important of which is the reported announcement by Kawthulay radio on 30 June that the Karens had decided to throw in their lot with the BCP. No further details of this announcement are available but it comes at a time when it is known from other sources that the Karens have been giving active consideration to their future. They argue that since China, the strongest power in the Far East, is already Communist their best chance of securing their aims of an autonomous state and the protection of their interests now lies in whole-hearted support of the Burmese Communists rather than lukewarm support for or resistance to them which might prejudice their case when Communism came into power in Burma.
17. Despite the fact that members of the CP(B) Central Committee signed an agreement with the BCP which committed the CP(B) to support the major part of BCP policy and collaborate in the unification of the two parties, there is every indication that Thakin SOE is still pursuing an independent line and is critical of the BCP and its United Front policy. It seems

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that the most that the BCP can hope for in the immediate future is to win over individual leaders and groups to the United Front, and possibly absorb them in to the BCP as opposed to uniting with the CP(B) as a whole. The same is likely with regard to the PVOs who are disorganized and politically unstable.

18. The relations between the BCP and the BWPP appear to have reached a stage from which any further development must be on the initiative of the latter. An approach was made by BCP representatives to Thakin CHIT MAUNG, General Secretary of the BWPP, in March 1951 to sound out the views of the BWPP on collaboration between the two parties. Thakin CHIT MAUNG explained that the BWPP was not prepared to jeopardize its present position since it felt that it was well placed to secure complete control of labor in Rangoon; any agreement with the BCP would involve going underground and this the BWPP was not prepared to do. Such an attitude is logical while the BWPP has any reasonable chance of gaining influence by legal and constitutional means; there is some confirmation that it is authentic in the statement of a leader of the World Peace Congress (Burma) (BWPP-controlled) that the time had not yet come to merge its peace movement with the BCP's World Peace Congress (Burma) in the insurgent-held areas.
19. There has recently, however, been evidence of overt collaboration between pro-BCP and pro-BWPP elements in student circles. At the beginning of 1951 both groups independently set up committees to reorganize an "All Burma" students organization (none has existed overtly since the All Burma Students Union went underground in March 1949); these two groups have now agreed to combine and a National Festival Committee recently formed in connection with the forthcoming World Youth and Student Festival in Berlin is largely a joint affair (see paragraph 32).

BCP Attitude to the General Elections.

20. Prior to the first installment of the General Elections, the BCP made its attitude towards them known in a series of instructions. Every effort was to be made to prevent the elections being held in those areas where the BCP had influence, but in areas where the Government was strong enough to prevent any interference, different tactics were to be adopted. Party members and sympathizers should if possible contest the elections; otherwise BCP supporters should cast their votes for opposition candidates who might support the policy of the BCP. A final instruction issued at the end of May ordered district headquarters concerned to instruct its members to cast their votes for BWPP candidates. In view of this it seems unlikely that any BCP secret Party member or sympathizer stood for election and none has been identified among the numerous candidates nominated.
21. Party propaganda on the subject has consistently maintained that the elections would be rigged and were purely an artifice through which the AFPFL Government, on reelection, might claim mass support in intensifying its pro-American activities.

Links with China

22. The interrogation of a number of insurgents who surrendered at the beginning of January 1951 has thrown further light on the extent of the liaison between the BCP and the China Communist Party. It is now known that a party of 24 PDF officials traveled to China in December 1950 for a course of political and military training which, it is said, will last two years, and it is probable that there is an additional body of 100 PDF combatants undergoing a shorter period of military training. Clearly some prior direct liaison must have taken place before these courses could have been arranged but how and when has still not been confirmed, nor has it been possible to confirm the earlier report that Thakin THAN TUN had himself been to Peiping to meet MAO Tse-tung. (It will be noticed that in his speech, paragraph 11 above, he denied that any such meeting had taken place). In addition to AUNG WIN, who is known still to be in Peiping with

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the Asian and Australasian Trades Union Liaison Bureau, it appears almost certain that Thakin AUNG GYI, a senior well-educated Party leader, and THAN SEWE are also in China, but the nature of their functions there and their whereabouts have still to be ascertained.

23. A report that small quantities of arms had begun to arrive for the BCP from China still lacks confirmation. Investigations are however proceeding into the source of supply of a dump of about 100 assorted arms, together with quantities of gold and opium, which was seized near Nawnghkio on 12 June and which is reported to have been smuggled across the border. It seems possible that these arms were the property of the BCP in that on his way back from seizing the dump the Army officer in charge of the operation was killed by BCP insurgents, of whom there is a small concentration in the Nawnghkio area.

Communist Party (Burma)

24. Mention has been made in paragraph 17 above of Thakin SOE's attitude towards the BCP and the United Front. It was noticeable that in a batch of some 13 documents, seized in March from a CP(B) courier who was on his way to Upper Burma from Rangoon, there was only one mention of the United Front and that couched in derogatory terms. These same documents, several of which were from Thakin SOE himself, revealed that CP(B) officials had been active in penetrating the Burma Muslim Congress and student circles and that they were planning to extend their student activity into the districts. The documents also revealed that Thakin SOE had little effective control over the Upper Burma CP(B), among whom considerable dissension existed between the regional leaders and leaders of two front organizations known as the Anti-Bureaucracy Council and the Ex-Red Flag Soldiers Union.

Burma Workers and Peasants Party

25. A Peoples Parliamentary Democratic Front (PPDF) was initiated by the BWPP in March 1951 as a body which they hoped would attract the support of anti-AFPFL members of Parliament, in particular U AUNG THAN, brother of the late AUNG SAN, and PVO personalities. The BWPP hoped through this body to coordinate leftist groups with a view to mobilizing effective opposition to AFPFL candidates at the forthcoming elections. The PPDF was, however, short-lived because of the unwillingness of other groups to collaborate with the BWPP, so that in the event the BWPP contested the elections alone under the title of the "Peoples Democratic Front", which was formally inaugurated with Thakin LWIN as President on 15 May. Of the results so far known, the Party has won the seats of Tharawaddy, Wakema, and Letpadan. They also claim that the Peoples Peace Front candidate elected in Madon Constituency supports them.
26. In the districts the BWPP has continued its organizational activities and further branches have been established in Mandalay, Thaton, Pegu, and Minhlā.

Burma Trade Union Congress (BTUC)

27. The BWPP's labor organization, the Burma Trade Union Congress, has been active throughout the period in an attempt to secure further support among the workers in Rangoon and in the oilfields. Their technique with regard to small and inexperienced unions has been to start agitation on straight-forward issues such as wages and working hours. Four such incidents are known in Rangoon where at the instance of the BTUC, workers presented a list of high-sounding demands to their employers and threatened to strike if these were not granted by a given date. In no case so far, however, have the BTUC incited a successful strike and there is evidence in at least one case that the "demands" were only submitted under pressure and did not in fact reflect the workers' views. At their May Day celebration, however, the BTUC secured an attendance of about 4,000 workers as compared with some 10,000 who attended the parallel celebration sponsored by the Burma Socialist Party's Trade Union Congress (Burma).

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28. Resolutions passed at the BTUC May Day celebrations called for the formation of a "Peoples Democratic Front" (paragraph 25 above) to fight against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucracy, condemned the acceptance of foreign aid from the imperialists, denounced American aggression in Korea, and demanded the negotiation of a Peace Treaty between the Big Five, and the cessation of America's rearming of Japan.
29. At a meeting at the end of May, resolutions commended Iran's decision to nationalize the oil industry and called on the Government to take similar action in Burma. A motion of censure was also passed against the Government of New Zealand for its "fascist action against stevedore labor" and a sub-committee was appointed to find ways and means of giving assistance to the striking New Zealand laborers and boycotting New Zealand ships arriving in Rangoon. But there is as yet no sign of any activity in this direction.

The World Peace Congress (Burma) (WPC(B))

30. The BWPP's World Peace Congress (Burma), in which some pro-BCP elements are active, has continued its campaign on orthodox lines and is now busy with the signature campaign in support of the appeal of the World Peace Council for a peace pact between the five great powers. July is to be made a month of special effort in this respect. Further branches have been opened at Moulmein, Thaton, and Akyab.
31. A leading official of the WPC(B) has commented that "complete understanding" existed between the WPC(B) and the peace movement sponsored by the China Democratic League (Burma) but that the time had not yet come to merge their movement with that of the BCP in the insurgent areas.

Berlin World Youth and Student Festival

32. Pro-BCP elements among the Rangoon students have been in touch with the Secretariat of the World Festival Committee and announced their intention to send a delegation to the Berlin Festival. A preliminary meeting, held on 3 June at the Headquarters of the Burma Trades Union Congress to consider the formation of a National Festival Committee, was attended by representatives of the pro-BCP All Burma Students Federation Organization Committee, the BWPP Youth Commission, the All Burma Indian Youth League, the World Peace Congress (Burma), and local Chinese youth organizations. In addition there were representatives of the non-political group in the Rangoon University Students Union and of such bodies as the Christian Youth Council.
33. On 17 June the National Festival Committee was formed and a Central Working Committee appointed consisting of 12 officials, of whom four are known BCP supporters, and another four BWPP supporters. A valuable point was gained by the Communist elements in securing the participation of U TIN, Vice President of the All Burma Youth League as President of the Central Working Committee. The All Burma Youth League is the strongest youth organization in the country; over the past three years it has insisted on keeping clear of all domestic and international political issues - a position which it still professes to maintain.
34. The National Festival Committee has decided to send 6 delegates to Berlin, but no nominations have yet been made. In the meantime an intensive campaign is being conducted to collect funds to finance the delegation, primarily through the sale of locally made paper flags bearing the crest of the International Union of Students. In this, pro-China Democratic League (CDL) youth and student organizations are giving active assistance by making collections among the Chinese community in Rangoon. The Burma National Festival Committee has also been promised assistance from the International Solidarity Fund provided the delegation proceeds to Berlin.

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35. Burmese representation in Prague, the headquarters of the International Union of Students, has probably increased in that TUN SHEIN who has been there since August 1949 as accredited representative of the All Burma Students Union and the BCP, is believed to have been joined in September 1950 by YE HTUT (aka TUN KYI) another Burmese student. At the end of June 1951 TUN SHWE, who had been the communications link in India between TUN SHEIN and his associates in Burma, succeeded in evading the Indian police who were to serve a deportation order on him and flew to Europe via Ceylon.

Local Chinese Activities - China Democratic League (Burma)

36. The main weight of the CDL(B) campaign to secure control of the Chinese community has been directed at local Chinese schools, the objective being to secure the adoption in all educational establishments of text books approved by the China Peoples Government. In April special classes were held during the vacation by the Burma Chinese Teachers Union, a CDL(B) controlled organization, to instruct teachers in the use of the new text books and to standardize the method of teaching in schools. At the same time the Burma Chinese Students Union was holding summer classes, the purpose of which is believed to have been political indoctrination.
37. As the start of the new term approached a campaign of abuse, in which most CDL(B) controlled organizations eventually played some part, was developed against the headmistress of a Chinese Girls school who had announced her intention to use new Chinese Nationalist text books which she was expecting from Singapore. The opening of this school was prevented by a picket of pro-CDL students and a parallel institution using the school's name was set up by some of the other teachers who had gone over to the CDL-controlled Burma Chinese Teachers Union. Friction between CDL and pro-Kuomintang elements became so serious over this incident that on 5 June the Burmese authorities had to step in and seal both the official and unofficial school premises.
38. On the following day CHAN Soon-siok, a leading personality in the local CDL circles and in the Chinese community as a whole, was murdered in the street. The CDL-controlled press and demonstrations organized by pro-CDL organizations immediately emphasized that CHAN Soon-siok had been opposed to the headmistress' proposal to introduce the new Chinese Nationalist text books and attributed the crime to KMT elements in Rangoon. CHAN Soon-siok's funeral on 12 June was made into a major demonstration depicting CHAN soon-siok as a martyr who had died for New China, and the Chinese Ambassador, supported by various Chinese organizations, was insistent in demanding of the Burmese authorities that certain KMT leaders should be immediately arrested, regardless of the fact that there was no evidence to connect them with the crime. (He thus made himself even more unpopular with the Burmese authorities.) A major anti-KMT propaganda campaign has been developed from the incident and the situation is arising where any Chinese educational establishment not firmly under the control of one side or the other is liable to become a political battleground.
39. CDL youth and student organizations, with the assistance of the KMT Revolutionary Committee, have been seeking to persuade the students to return to China to complete their education, and in mid-June a party of sixteen, including seven under the age of fifteen, sailed from Rangoon for China. It is reported that a number of these students travelled without their parents' permission.

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